Αρθρο στούς NYT μιλάει (και αυτό) γιά πτώχευση τής Ελλάδας αλλά καί πάγωμα τών καταθέσεων στίς ελληνικές τράπεζες !!!!
Ισως η πτώχευση δέν είναι η χειρότερη επιλογή γιά την Ελλάδα, λένε αναλυτές...
Από το να περιμένεις και να ζείς έναν αργό θάνατο , πολύ καλύτερα θα ήταν ένα σόκ πτώχευσης πού θα έβαζε τη χώρα σέ τροχιά επίλυσης τού προβλήματος, ισχυρίζονται....
Δέν υπάρχει καμμία αμφιβολία ότι η κατάσταση είναι πολύ δύσκολη...
Η χώρα - και σε αυτό συμφωνούν όλοι - δέν θα μπορέσει να τα καταφέρει μόνη της...
Παρά τίς απόψεις τής ελληνικής κυβέρνησης όλο και πιό πολλοί αναλυτές συμφωνούν ότι θα χρειαστεί μιά κάποιου τύπου διάσωση...
Τό χειρότερο όμως είναι ότι η πτώχευση παρουσιάζεται σάν ένα λογικό σενάριο, καί μάλιστα καλύτερο απο αυτό πού γίνεται τώρα, και σάν ένα ταμπού πού ενδεχομένως θα πρέπει να σπάσει...
Θυμίζουμε ότι οι Ευρωπαίοι έχουν δηλώσει ότι δέν θα αφήσουν την Ελλάδα να πέσει...
Απο τήν άλλη όμως δέν βοηθάνε...
Οι Γερμανοί γιά παράδειγμα πιστεύουν ότι η Ελλάδα πρέπει να πληρώνει τα επιτόκια τών αγορών και ότι αυτό είναι μιά δίκαιη εξέλιξη...
Ανθρωποι πού γνωρίζουν οικονομικά μάς λένε ότι αυστηρά οικονομικά έχουν δίκιο...
Ομως εδώ μιλάμε γιά ανθρώπους...
Μιλάμε γιά τήν οικονομική (και άρα και κοινωνική, ψυχολογική) καταστροφή μιάς γενιάς Ελλήνων...
Οι άνθρωποι δέν είναι νούμερα μόνο...
Οπως και να έχει η κατάσταση είναι πολύ δύσκολη...
Διαβάστε στούς ΝΥΤ πώς μιλάνε για την ελληνική πτώχευση...
Πώς περιγράφουν τί θα πρέπει να γίνει με τις ελληνικές τράπεζες...
Είναι σίγουρο ότι μετά απο όλα αυτά τα σημερινά η διαφυγή ελληνικών χρημάτων απο ελληνικές τράπεζες θα ενταθεί...
Με άλλα λόγια αυτά τα άρθρα υπάρχει κίνδυνος να προκαλέσουν αυτό πού περιγράφουν σάν πρόβλεψη...
Δείτε το άρθρο...
Should Greece Be Allowed to Default?
April 6, 2010, 4:52 AM
Forget about Greece for a moment. Just think about country X, which has lived well beyond its means for years thanks to loans from inattentive or foolishly optimistic lenders. When the financial crisis comes, the people of the country will have to cut back on spending. And the country’s lenders will generally suffer from the famous rule of banking: “Can’t pay, won’t pay.”
If Herman Van Rompuy, the president of the European Council, has his way, Greece is not going to be country X despite its weak government, bloated civil service and poor trade position. Mr. Van Rompuy recently said that a vague new support agreement should “reassure all the holders of Greek bonds that the euro zone will never let Greece fail.” This default taboo may need reconsideration, Reuters Breakingviews argues.
True, the Greeks might manage to tough it out. But it won’t be easy, even if the European Union, the International Monetary Fund and foreign investors help, Breakingviews says. A near miraculous economic recovery would be required to turn the country from sharp recession and falling wages to fast growth. The euro makes the task harder, because Greece cannot stimulate growth through devaluation.
A limited default, like rescheduling combined with modest write-downs, would make the task more manageable and would have the benefit of appropriately punishing risk-blind lenders and complacent politicians, Breakingviews argues. But Mr. Van Rompuy and many investors fear a sovereign default would start a chain reaction of panic and failures, perhaps breaking up the euro zone.
The worries are certainly not groundless, even if Greece’s debt of 270 billion euros is only 4 percent of all euro zone sovereign obligations, Breakingviews says. A write-down could reduce Greek banks to insolvency. Other fragile European banks would suffer. Other weak sovereign borrowers might follow, intentionally or not, creating a cascade of traumatic defaults.
But in reality, carefully planned debt write-downs could be less destabilizing for markets than a long wait to see if Greece can struggle through, according to the publication. The uncertainty is distorting the euro zone’s politics and the euro’s value. A solution, even a bitter one, would calm nerves, Breakingviews suggests. And the risks of a Lehman Brothers-style collapse could be reduced by a three-pronged preparation.
First, the market needs to be softened up for bad news, Breakingviews says. For months, politicians like Mr. Van Rompuy have been trying to convince a doubtful world that a Greek default is unthinkable. A change would cause a shock, but on reflection investors might actually welcome a more realistic approach.
Second, banks need to be kept in business, according to Breakingviews. The Greek government does not have enough money to rescue its own banks, so some tough but fair measures would be needed: converting the country’s bank debt into equity, freezing bank deposits and perhaps selling to healthy foreign institutions.
Foreign banks holding Greek paper might need government help to get through write-downs, Breakingviews suggests. That path is well-trodden and it might prove less costly for other European Union governments to help banks directly rather than offering indirect help through guarantees or loans to the Greek government.
Finally, other members of the euro zone with debt problems would need to get ready, Breakingviews says. Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain have already started to argue that they are fundamentally different from Greece. If their cases are persuasive, investors will not abandon these governments. But if one or more cannot avoid a debt restructuring, then delay will not reduce the eventual pain.
The Greek problem is important for the world, because the country has a particularly acute case of a common financial disease: debts that are too large to be serviced by its current incomes. The leverage-fed global bubble in asset prices has left many individuals, some companies and a daunting list of countries at credible risk of default whenever interest rates rise from their current ultralow levels. The United States and the Britain are certainly on the list, Breakingviews says.
The Van Rompuy solution, a combination of growth and frugality, can solve the problem, but only if creditors are patient and debtors are virtuous. Historically, the more common ways to cut debt loads have been monetary: straight write-downs of loans, inflationary increases in incomes or currency devaluations that reduce the real value of repayments to foreign lenders.
Debt overhangs are unseemly, and all the monetary solutions are unpleasant. But default may not be the worst, Reuters Breakingviews posits. In Greece and elsewhere, the publication says, it shouldn’t be dismissed without first getting serious consideration.
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/should-greece-be-allowed-to-default/?scp=2&sq=greece&st=cse
Από το να περιμένεις και να ζείς έναν αργό θάνατο , πολύ καλύτερα θα ήταν ένα σόκ πτώχευσης πού θα έβαζε τη χώρα σέ τροχιά επίλυσης τού προβλήματος, ισχυρίζονται....
Δέν υπάρχει καμμία αμφιβολία ότι η κατάσταση είναι πολύ δύσκολη...
Η χώρα - και σε αυτό συμφωνούν όλοι - δέν θα μπορέσει να τα καταφέρει μόνη της...
Παρά τίς απόψεις τής ελληνικής κυβέρνησης όλο και πιό πολλοί αναλυτές συμφωνούν ότι θα χρειαστεί μιά κάποιου τύπου διάσωση...
Τό χειρότερο όμως είναι ότι η πτώχευση παρουσιάζεται σάν ένα λογικό σενάριο, καί μάλιστα καλύτερο απο αυτό πού γίνεται τώρα, και σάν ένα ταμπού πού ενδεχομένως θα πρέπει να σπάσει...
Θυμίζουμε ότι οι Ευρωπαίοι έχουν δηλώσει ότι δέν θα αφήσουν την Ελλάδα να πέσει...
Απο τήν άλλη όμως δέν βοηθάνε...
Οι Γερμανοί γιά παράδειγμα πιστεύουν ότι η Ελλάδα πρέπει να πληρώνει τα επιτόκια τών αγορών και ότι αυτό είναι μιά δίκαιη εξέλιξη...
Ανθρωποι πού γνωρίζουν οικονομικά μάς λένε ότι αυστηρά οικονομικά έχουν δίκιο...
Ομως εδώ μιλάμε γιά ανθρώπους...
Μιλάμε γιά τήν οικονομική (και άρα και κοινωνική, ψυχολογική) καταστροφή μιάς γενιάς Ελλήνων...
Οι άνθρωποι δέν είναι νούμερα μόνο...
Οπως και να έχει η κατάσταση είναι πολύ δύσκολη...
Διαβάστε στούς ΝΥΤ πώς μιλάνε για την ελληνική πτώχευση...
Πώς περιγράφουν τί θα πρέπει να γίνει με τις ελληνικές τράπεζες...
Είναι σίγουρο ότι μετά απο όλα αυτά τα σημερινά η διαφυγή ελληνικών χρημάτων απο ελληνικές τράπεζες θα ενταθεί...
Με άλλα λόγια αυτά τα άρθρα υπάρχει κίνδυνος να προκαλέσουν αυτό πού περιγράφουν σάν πρόβλεψη...
Δείτε το άρθρο...
Should Greece Be Allowed to Default?
April 6, 2010, 4:52 AM
Forget about Greece for a moment. Just think about country X, which has lived well beyond its means for years thanks to loans from inattentive or foolishly optimistic lenders. When the financial crisis comes, the people of the country will have to cut back on spending. And the country’s lenders will generally suffer from the famous rule of banking: “Can’t pay, won’t pay.”
If Herman Van Rompuy, the president of the European Council, has his way, Greece is not going to be country X despite its weak government, bloated civil service and poor trade position. Mr. Van Rompuy recently said that a vague new support agreement should “reassure all the holders of Greek bonds that the euro zone will never let Greece fail.” This default taboo may need reconsideration, Reuters Breakingviews argues.
True, the Greeks might manage to tough it out. But it won’t be easy, even if the European Union, the International Monetary Fund and foreign investors help, Breakingviews says. A near miraculous economic recovery would be required to turn the country from sharp recession and falling wages to fast growth. The euro makes the task harder, because Greece cannot stimulate growth through devaluation.
A limited default, like rescheduling combined with modest write-downs, would make the task more manageable and would have the benefit of appropriately punishing risk-blind lenders and complacent politicians, Breakingviews argues. But Mr. Van Rompuy and many investors fear a sovereign default would start a chain reaction of panic and failures, perhaps breaking up the euro zone.
The worries are certainly not groundless, even if Greece’s debt of 270 billion euros is only 4 percent of all euro zone sovereign obligations, Breakingviews says. A write-down could reduce Greek banks to insolvency. Other fragile European banks would suffer. Other weak sovereign borrowers might follow, intentionally or not, creating a cascade of traumatic defaults.
But in reality, carefully planned debt write-downs could be less destabilizing for markets than a long wait to see if Greece can struggle through, according to the publication. The uncertainty is distorting the euro zone’s politics and the euro’s value. A solution, even a bitter one, would calm nerves, Breakingviews suggests. And the risks of a Lehman Brothers-style collapse could be reduced by a three-pronged preparation.
First, the market needs to be softened up for bad news, Breakingviews says. For months, politicians like Mr. Van Rompuy have been trying to convince a doubtful world that a Greek default is unthinkable. A change would cause a shock, but on reflection investors might actually welcome a more realistic approach.
Second, banks need to be kept in business, according to Breakingviews. The Greek government does not have enough money to rescue its own banks, so some tough but fair measures would be needed: converting the country’s bank debt into equity, freezing bank deposits and perhaps selling to healthy foreign institutions.
Foreign banks holding Greek paper might need government help to get through write-downs, Breakingviews suggests. That path is well-trodden and it might prove less costly for other European Union governments to help banks directly rather than offering indirect help through guarantees or loans to the Greek government.
Finally, other members of the euro zone with debt problems would need to get ready, Breakingviews says. Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain have already started to argue that they are fundamentally different from Greece. If their cases are persuasive, investors will not abandon these governments. But if one or more cannot avoid a debt restructuring, then delay will not reduce the eventual pain.
The Greek problem is important for the world, because the country has a particularly acute case of a common financial disease: debts that are too large to be serviced by its current incomes. The leverage-fed global bubble in asset prices has left many individuals, some companies and a daunting list of countries at credible risk of default whenever interest rates rise from their current ultralow levels. The United States and the Britain are certainly on the list, Breakingviews says.
The Van Rompuy solution, a combination of growth and frugality, can solve the problem, but only if creditors are patient and debtors are virtuous. Historically, the more common ways to cut debt loads have been monetary: straight write-downs of loans, inflationary increases in incomes or currency devaluations that reduce the real value of repayments to foreign lenders.
Debt overhangs are unseemly, and all the monetary solutions are unpleasant. But default may not be the worst, Reuters Breakingviews posits. In Greece and elsewhere, the publication says, it shouldn’t be dismissed without first getting serious consideration.
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/should-greece-be-allowed-to-default/?scp=2&sq=greece&st=cse
Σχόλια
Οπως εγραψες οι αγορες θα αποφασισουν ποιος νικησε στις 25 Μαρτιου.Και οι αγορες αποφασισαν Μερκελ με λιγη βοηθεια από το Γιωργο που εθεσε ζητημα νεας συμφωνιας για να τιναξει τα spread και αφου κανει τη ζημια να τρεχει μετα να διαψευδει καποιο "ανωνυμο" που δηθεν εθεσε θεμα ενω ηταν σε ολες τις εφημεριδες του Πασχα οτι το ειπε ο Γιωργος.
Αρα τωρα η φαση Β : Εν ειδει καμικαζι απειλει οτι θα χρεωκοπησει επιτηδες για να αναγκασει τους Γερμανους να πληρωσουν -με το σιγονταρισμα των Αμερικανων.
Το μονο "προβλημα" στο σχεδιο αυτο ειναι οτι εχει πει στον ελληνικο λαο οτι δεν υπαρχει τετοιο ζητημα και οσο περνα ο καιρος ολο και δυσκολοτερα θα τα ριχνει στους προηγουμενους.
Αν ομως στη ΝΔ συνεχισουν να κοιμουνται ολα γινονται.