Οι αμερικανοι, και καλα, δεν μπορεσαν να πιεσουν τους σκοπιανους και πηραν ενα βετο και εναν south stream να εχουν να πορευονται...

Mαθιου Μπραιζα:
Η Ελλαδα μας κοροιδεψε στο θεμα του south stream. Μας ειχαν υποσχεθει οτι δεν θα υπεγραφαν.
Ισβεστια (ρωσικη εγκυρη εφημεριδα):
«Η τελευταία ενέργεια του Πούτιν στον τομέα της εξωτερικής πολιτικής υπό την ιδιότητα του προέδρου αποτέλεσε αντικειμενικά έναν επιπλέον, καταληκτικό θρίαμβό του»,συμπεραίνει η ιστορική ημερήσια «Ιζβέστια», εξαίροντας τη σημασία του σχεδίου South Stream και παραθέτοντας δήλωση του Ρώσου υπουργού Ενέργειας Βίκτορ Χριστένκο, σύμφωνα με την οποία στην Ελλάδα σχεδιάζεται να πουληθούν περίπου 10 δισ. κυβικά μέτρα ρωσικού αερίου
Πουτιν:
Τι να τον κανεις τον αγωγο (nabucco) αμα δεν εχεις αεριο να βαλεις μεσα? Εμεις (south stream) εχουμε ενω αυτοι (αμερικανοι, nabucco) εχουν μονο σωληνες μεσα στη γη.
Φωλιας, ΕΕ:
Με ιδιο λεξιλογιο λενε οτι οι δυο αγωγοι δεν ανταγωνιστικοι μεταξυ τους. (σε ελευθερη αποδοση: τους πηραμε τα σωβρακα ειναι τελειωμενη υποθεση ο ναμπουκο)
Συμπερασμα?
Οι αμερικανοι θελοντας να παρακαμψουν τη Ρωσια σχεδιαζαν να υλοποιησουν τον αγωγο ναμπουκο ο οποιος θα μετεφερε αεριο απο το αζερμπαιτζαν μεσω Τουρκιας , Βουλγαριας Αυστριας κλπ στην ευρωπη. Ο στοχος ηταν να μεινει εκτος η Ρωσια για να μην μπορει να εκβιαζει την Ευρωπη κοβοντας την παροχη αεριου. Η Ελλαδα επισης ηταν εκτος.Οι αμερικανοι ομως μας εδωσαν τον TGI (τουρκια-Ελλαδα-Ιταλια). Γιαυτο μυξοκλαιει τωρα ο Μπραιζα. Σου λεει και σας δωσαμε TGI και μας πουλησατε.
Οι Ρωσοι αντεπιτεθηκαν και τους πηραν τη μπουκια απο το στομα. Μια μια οι χωρες εγκαταλειπουν τον αγωγο ναμπουκο που επρικειτο να ξεκινησει μεσα στο 2008. Ακομα και η Τουρκια φαινεται να τι σκεφτεται. Μιλαμε για ρωσικο θριαμβο και συντριβη της αμερικανικης λογικης. Η Ελλαδα επαιξε καθοριστικο ρολο σε αυτο.
Υπαρχουν ενδειξεις οτι εγινε διαπραγματευση για εθνικα θεματα οπου η Ελλαδα ανεμενε βοηθεια απο τους αμερικανους η οποια οπως ολοι ξερουμε δεν δοθηκε ποτε.
Ετσι ο κυβος εριφθη.
Στην ουσια οταν ο Νιμ ιτς παρουσιασε την τελικη του προταση στην Αθηνα επεσαν απο τα συννεφα γιατι αλλο , μαλλον , ηταν το ντηλ.
Οι αμερικανοι , και καλα, δεν μπορεσαν να πιεσουν τους σκοπιανους και πηραν ενα βετο και εναν south stream να εχουν να πορευονται.

Σχόλια

Ο χρήστης Ανώνυμος είπε…
τελικα εχουν δικιο οι αμερικανοι..
ο καραμανλης τους σαμποταρει και στον μεγαλης στρατηγικης σημασιας AMBO...

απο αρθρο που διαβασα

The AMBO pipeline is not only short of money but also faces the danger of competition from another trans-Balkan rival.

This is the Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline, a joint project of Bulgaria, Greek and Russia, designed over a decade ago to bring Russian crude oil to the Mediterranean and bypass the crowded Turkish straits.

The Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline project has a fundamentally different supply model compared to AMBO project, with Russia acting as the guarantor of supplies

Meanwhile, the AMBO and the Burgas-Alexandroupolis projects are in a race over which one will operate first. The winner will obviously be in a better position to secure oil transportation

Zoran Gligorov, of the Macedonian ministry of finance, says that despite their common interests, the Balkan countries are all competing with each other over oil.

"If Greece manages to build first the pipeline crossing its territory, the whole AMBO project will become less profitable," he noted.

Gligorov said the future of the project was in Russia's hands, as Skopje has little ability to influence matters.

Opinion in Macedonia is that Greece is firmly behind the Burgas-Alexandroupolis project, and that it has Bulgaria on its side.
Ο χρήστης Ανώνυμος είπε…
AGREEMENT SIGNED ON TRANS-BALKAN OIL PIPELINE, RIVAL TO TRANS-CASPIAN PROJECT

By Vladimir Socor

Friday, March 16, 2007



Russian President Vladimir Putin Yesterday, March 15, Russia, Bulgaria, and Greece signed an intergovernmental agreement to build the Trans-Balkan Oil Pipeline, Burgas-Alexandropolis. Russian President Vladimir Putin, in full command of the signing ceremonies, took it upon himself to define the project’s significance and the interests of other participants in the project. The pipeline, the first-ever to be controlled by the Russian state on European Union territory, would carry oil mainly from Russian Black Sea ports to the Aegean for shipment from there by tankers.

The project’s main official rationale is to provide a second outlet from the Black Sea, circumventing the overcrowded Bosporus, for Russian oil and Russian-loaded Caspian oil en route to the open seas. With those flows a growing danger to safety in the Bosporus Strait, a pipeline bypass from Burgas to Alexandropolis is in essence a transport-safety-enhancing project, necessary in that strict sense.

However, the Burgas-Alexandropolis project runs counter to the EU’s strategic interest of reducing dependence on Russia-delivered energy. If built, this pipeline will become, in effect, a prolongation of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) line from Kazakhstan to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, in direct rivalry to trans-Caspian oil transport projects from Kazakhstan westward, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (Turkey) pipeline. The Burgas-Alexandropolis line would also divert Caspian oil volumes necessary to the Odessa-Brody pipeline in Ukraine and its possible extension into Poland.

Proceeding with Burgas-Alexandropolis and a commitment to its use by Western companies in Kazakhstan is a Russian precondition to the planned enlargement of the CPC pipeline from Kazakhstan. The U.S., European, and Kazakh oil companies face production delays and financial losses because Russia has blocked that pipeline’s capacity expansion in the last three years. To allow that expansion, Moscow wants those companies to export their oil from Kazakhstan through Russia, as opposed to exporting it across the Caspian and the South Caucasus to the open seas.

The Burgas-Alexandropolis project can lend decisive impetus to enlarging the capacity of the CPC pipeline into Russia. That line’s existing capacity amounts to some 27 million tons annually. If enlarged significantly beyond that capacity -- let alone the colossal 67 million tons annually as planned -- the CPC line would suck up massive production volumes from ongoing and upcoming projects in Kazakhstan, including the supergiant Kashagan fields, to the detriment of trans-Caspian projects that answer Western strategic interests.

Even in a short-to-medium term perspective, the Baku-Ceyhan system requires significant additional volumes of Kazakh oil. Inputs into that system from Kazakhstan will become critical within less than a decade. However, an expanded CPC pipeline would divert most of those volumes into Russian territory to Novorossiysk and from there via the Black Sea into the Russian state-controlled Burgas-Alexandropolis pipeline.

Burgas-Alexandropolis developments also affect negatively the prospects for the EU-supported Odessa-Brody-Plock (Poland) project. That route is also an alternative to the Turkish Straits as an oil exit from the Black Sea. However, availability of the Burgas-Alexandropolis outlet can ensure long-term use of the Odessa-Brody pipeline by Russian companies north-south, instead of the originally intended south-north use for Caspian oil to Europe.

According to Putin and other officials at yesterday’s signing ceremony in Athens, future users of the Burgas-Alexandropolis pipeline will have to negotiate with Russia’s state pipeline monopoly Transneft regarding the oil volumes and schedules for using this pipeline. This means that U.S. and West European companies will depend on the Russian state for accessing EU territory to transport oil extracted by Western companies for Western consumers.

In his speech at the agreement’s signing, Putin predicted that Western companies in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, as well as those two countries themselves, would be using this pipeline. Chevron has publicly indicated its intention to do so, while the CPC consortium seems to be hedging its bets for now in its public comments.

Transneft, GazpromNeft, and Rosneft hold a combined 51% stake in the Burgas-Alexandropolis project, with Transneft as project operator. The Greek and Bulgarian governments hold the remaining 49% initially, with the right to sell portions of their stakes to international or Russian oil companies that would use this transit pipeline. The Greek side in Burgas-Alexandropolis consists of three companies, one of them a Gazprom joint venture. The Bulgarian stakeholder, BulgarGaz, is known to be eyed by Gazprom for setting up a joint venture.

The pipeline is intended to carry 35 million tons of oil annually in the first phase, with expansion to 50 million tons in the second phase. Financing has yet to be lined up on international credit markets; the Russian side will not finance this project, at least not directly. The intergovernmental agreement is subject to parliamentary ratification in the three countries.