απο καθημερινη.
O αγωγός South Stream δεν είναι ανταγωνιστικός αλλά συμπληρωματικός σε σχέση με τον αγωγό Nabucco και ως εκ τούτου δεν υφίσταται πρόβλημα από πλευράς της Ευρωπαϊκής Ενωσης.
Αυτό απάντησε σήμερα εκπρόσωπος της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής στις Βρυξέλλες, ο οποίος ρωτήθηκε αν ο αγωγός South Stream, του οποίου η κατασκευή εισέρχεται στην τελική φάση μετά και τη χθεσινή ελληνο-ρωσική συμφωνία, συνιστά πρόβλημα σε σχέση με τον αγωγό Nabucco, του οποίου η κατασκευή ενισχύεται από τα κοινοτικά ταμεία.
Ο εκπρόσωπος της Επιτροπής σημείωσε ότι η ΕΕ ενισχύει τον Nabucco με στόχο την τόνωση της ενεργειακής τροφοδοσίας της Ευρώπης από μη παραδοσιακές πηγές.
Ο South Stream, συνέχισε, αφορά τροφοδοσία από παραδοσιακές πηγές και ως εκ τούτου δεν έχει ανταγωνιστικό αλλά συμπληρωματικό ρόλο προς τον Nabucco, αναφορικά με την ενεργειακή ασφάλεια της Ευρώπης.
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Αλλη αντιληψη απο τους αμερικανους εχει η ΕΕ.
Αυτο ελειπε να ειχε και αντιρρηση.
Αφου ο Καραμανλης ηταν σε συνεννοηση με την Ευρωπη για αυτη την κινηση.
O αγωγός South Stream δεν είναι ανταγωνιστικός αλλά συμπληρωματικός σε σχέση με τον αγωγό Nabucco και ως εκ τούτου δεν υφίσταται πρόβλημα από πλευράς της Ευρωπαϊκής Ενωσης.
Αυτό απάντησε σήμερα εκπρόσωπος της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής στις Βρυξέλλες, ο οποίος ρωτήθηκε αν ο αγωγός South Stream, του οποίου η κατασκευή εισέρχεται στην τελική φάση μετά και τη χθεσινή ελληνο-ρωσική συμφωνία, συνιστά πρόβλημα σε σχέση με τον αγωγό Nabucco, του οποίου η κατασκευή ενισχύεται από τα κοινοτικά ταμεία.
Ο εκπρόσωπος της Επιτροπής σημείωσε ότι η ΕΕ ενισχύει τον Nabucco με στόχο την τόνωση της ενεργειακής τροφοδοσίας της Ευρώπης από μη παραδοσιακές πηγές.
Ο South Stream, συνέχισε, αφορά τροφοδοσία από παραδοσιακές πηγές και ως εκ τούτου δεν έχει ανταγωνιστικό αλλά συμπληρωματικό ρόλο προς τον Nabucco, αναφορικά με την ενεργειακή ασφάλεια της Ευρώπης.
-------------------------------------
Αλλη αντιληψη απο τους αμερικανους εχει η ΕΕ.
Αυτο ελειπε να ειχε και αντιρρηση.
Αφου ο Καραμανλης ηταν σε συνεννοηση με την Ευρωπη για αυτη την κινηση.
Σχόλια
A Trojan horse for Russia?On the energy field, this might already be happening..A few days ago, Russia, Bulgaria and Greece (what a surprise..) signed a pipeline-agreement that basically blows up the recent efforts of the EU to get a strategy implemented that will reduce its dependency on Russia
and Greece (what a surprise..)
πωπωπω χολη....
SOUTH STREAM GAS PROJECT DEFEATING NABUCCO BY DEFAULT
By Vladimir Socor
Gazprom’s blitzkrieg capture of five European Union member countries for its South Stream project, preempting the EU- and U.S.-backed Nabucco project, has shattered the credibility of Brussels’ and Washington’s energy security agendas. Country after country (excepting the lone holdout, Romania) have succumbed to the Kremlin-backed project because the Western one had neither gas resources, nor investment funds to offer after five years of efforts to obtain them.
By contrast, Gazprom comes up with the gas volumes, construction funds, and supplementary incentives in the form of collateral energy projects for the countries it targets. The deceptive nature of these offers is not always readily apparent to most of these countries; and when it becomes apparent, they see no realistic alternative materializing any time soon. Nabucco no longer looks plausible to them, given the continuing absence of Central Asian or Iranian gas for this project.
The countries joining South Stream (Italy, Greece, Serbia) and -- even more to the point -- those defecting from Nabucco in favor of South Stream (Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria) are motivated quite unsurprisingly by short-term thinking and opportunistic calculations on the economic level. They go for deals with Gazprom because their neighbors and potential competitors do so now; Brussels lacks the instruments of a common policy for energy projects, and Washington’s eminently sound cautionary advice comes without gas or investment credits and without top-level political support. Failing leadership on energy policy in Brussels and Washington gives “third-road” leaders, such as Hungary’s Socialist Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany, an excuse to position themselves strategically between Russia and the West.
Hungary’s incorporation into South Stream means that Gazprom has secured the final leg of the transit route for Caspian gas to Europe and the markets along that route to Vienna. The outgoing and incoming presidents of Russia, Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, witnessed the February 28 signing ceremony in the Kremlin with barely disguised gloating, to Gyurcsany’s fawning.
Putin derided the Nabucco project: “You can build a pipeline or even two, three, or five. The question is what fuel you put through it and where do you get that fuel. If someone wants to dig into the ground and bury metal there in the form of a pipeline, please do so, we don’t object.” Sarcastically, Putin dismissed the notion of a competition between Nabucco and South Stream: “There can be no competition when one project has the gas and the other does not” (Interfax, February 28; Rossiiskaya gazeta, February 29).
Gyurcsany demonstrated that he had internalized the arguments for surrender. Citing Putin’s 2006 proposals to extend South Stream (at that time as the Blue Stream-Two version) to Hungary and on to Austria, Gyurcsany thanked profusely: “It is with satisfaction and gratitude that I see Russia doing everything it has promised to us. Hungary has realized that it had no alternative to cooperation with Russia.” He portrayed the choice of South Stream as a Hungarian national choice, in preference to Nabucco: “You were faster than the [Nabucco] project. And it is up to us to determine the tempo of implementing projects in our interest” (Interfax, Russia Television Channel One, February 28).
The Hungarian government’s alibi for choosing South Stream is that Hungary supports Nabucco also -- an argument that ignores the two projects’ mutual incompatibility. But, in finally choosing South Stream, the government went to hyperbolic lengths, professing openness for an infinity of options. Its Moscow ambassador, Arpad Szekely, lobbying at home for South Stream, declared that Europe would need as many as 15 Russian gas pipelines and therefore Hungary’s choice of South Stream hardly makes a difference to the overall picture. In Moscow, Gyurcsany declared somewhat more modestly that Hungary would prefer to have two pipelines rather than one, or ideally three pipelines rather than two. The governmental Rossiiskaya gazeta (February 29) commented that the prime minister was “dreaming.”
In Brussels, the Russian ambassador to the European Union, Vladimir Chizhov, also felt able to deride the Nabucco project: “Nabucco is a classical example of an energy project that is being pushed to get rid of Russia. An empty pipe will bring no profits. What South Stream will be filled with is clear to us, but what Nabucco will be filled with, is clear to nobody” (Russia and CIS Business and Financial Newswire, February 29). What seems clear to Moscow is that South Stream -- if actually built -- would enable Gazprom to control Central Asian and even Iranian gas, for which the Nabucco project had been conceived.
The U.S. government made last-minute attempts to caution Hungary against rushing into the South Stream project. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matt Bryza gave several interviews to Western media, which Hungary’s media replayed, during the week prior to the Moscow signing event. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried published an article in Hungary’s leading newspaper, pointing to the economic disadvantages of South Stream to Hungary and the non-transparent endgame negotiations with Moscow (AP, Reuters, February 22, 25; Nepszabadsag, February 25, 28).
Hungary’s Fidesz opposition party and even the Free Democrats, junior partners to the Socialists in the government coalition, are criticizing the agreement with Moscow on South Stream and demanding a full-fledged parliamentary debate. However, due to Western failures to open access to Central Asian and Iranian gas, Russia’s South Stream is winning by default.
For now, the Kremlin and Gazprom are preempting supplies and markets against Nabucco and other Western-backed projects. Moscow’s offers are misleading, however. Gazprom will not, in fact, be able to provide the declared gas volumes for all of its existing and planned pipelines to Europe: Nord Stream, Yamal, the Ukrainian system, Blue Stream, and now South Stream. In the short-to-medium term, Gazprom itself faces gas supply shortfalls for Russia’s own rising internal consumption and its manifold export commitments.
Undoubtedly anticipating that situation, Gazprom seeks to accelerate pipeline construction in order to control European markets long-term through control of transportation and access, even if Gazprom’s own deliveries to Europe stagnate or decrease. At that stage, control of transportation -- particularly in the southern corridor through South Stream -- could position Russia to control the entry of pipeline-delivered gas to Europe from Central Asia and Iran. On top of its role as unwanted middleman, Gazprom would also become the gatekeeper of Europe’s southern corridor for energy supplies. Growing control of transport could extend Russia’s control of non-Russian gas en route to Europe and of the European markets, notwithstanding Gazprom’s own anticipated gas deficit.
By Vladimir Socor
Romania seems to be the one remaining loyal participant in the Nabucco pipeline project, which is planned to carry Caspian gas via Turkey and the Balkans to Central Europe. Defections are now cascading from this U.S.-backed, top-priority project of the European Union. The project can not survive on the existing form of support from Brussels and Washington, which remains mainly of a hortatory character, in the absence of access to Central Asian and Iranian gas. Opening such access could still rescue the Nabucco project from the collapse that now looms.
The last four weeks have witnessed a rapid transfer of loyalties to Gazprom’s rival project, South Stream, by four out of the five member countries in the Nabucco consortium. Austria’s government-controlled OMV company finalized agreements with Gazprom to turn Nabucco’s designated terminus and storage center, Baumgarten near Vienna, into a Gazprom-OMV 50%-50% company. OMV, which is Nabucco’s lead company, now proposes reserving half of the capacity of the Nabucco pipeline itself for Gazprom’s use. OMV share-boosting publicity, moreover, hinted at the possibility of a Gazprom-backed takeover by OMV of the private-owned MOL, the Hungarian partner in the Nabucco consortium (see EDM, January 29, February 5).
Concurrently, Bulgaria’s top political leaders and the Bulgargaz state company -- a member of the Nabucco consortium -- have concluded agreements with the Kremlin and Gazprom to include Bulgaria in the South Stream project (see EDM, January 24). This move also helps Gazprom to preempt Nabucco in the race for markets downstream and resources upstream and to keep Nabucco unbankable.
Using the Bulgarian springboard, Russia’s outgoing and incoming presidents, Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, sealed a wholesale capture of Serbia’s energy sector for and by Gazprom (see EDM, January 28, February 27). Although Serbia is not a member of the Nabucco consortium, its inclusion in Gazprom’s South Stream project has opened the way for Gazprom to expand directly into Hungary from the south.
Gazprom is now winning the race against Nabucco in Hungary as well. On February 25 the country’s Socialist prime minister, Ferenc Gyurcsany, agreed with the visiting Medvedev in Budapest to extend the South Stream pipeline into Hungary. The privately owned MOL has no part in this venture. The Hungarian government shall specially create a state company in a 50%-50% partnership with Gazprom to build and operate South Stream’s Hungary section (Nepszabadsag, February 25; Interfax, MTI, February 25-27). With this, the Socialists are also ushering in a partial re-etatization of Hungary’s energy system through a Russian-controlled process.
In Vienna, consequently, OMV’s CEO Wolfgang Ruttenstorfer is hailing Gazprom’s arrival in Austria from Hungary through the South Stream project, in addition to the existing pipeline from the east, both headed for the Baumgarten terminal system that was supposed to be Nabucco’s (Format [Vienna], February 23).
The Turkish government is also evidencing a loss of confidence in Nabucco. Ankara seems to approach this project from two different perspectives. On one hand, it is bargaining hard for commercial advantage in a spirit of short-sighted opportunism, risking to delay Nabucco sufficiently for Gazprom’s South Stream to enjoy a head start and win the race. The Turkish government and its pipeline company Botas seem to play a winner-take-all game against the other consortium partners, rather than a win-win game, over the terms of pricing, trading, and transporting Nabucco gas by pipeline through Turkey. Such an approach partly reflects serious skepticism about the prospects of Nabucco’s second phase following a small-scale first phase.
At the same time, Turkey fears losing the opportunity to become a transit and hub country through Nabucco, in the absence of access to Iranian gas (which Turkey rightly deems essential) or Central Asian gas (to which only Washington and Brussels, not Turkey, can open access). Turkish officials also seem unnerved by unrealistic recommendations from Nabucco well-wishers to use gas from the Kurdish-inhabited northern Iraq for Nabucco’s second phase.
Consequently, Turkish officials increasingly urge enlisting Gazprom in the Nabucco project to deliver “Russian” gas -- in fact, Central Asian gas volumes monopolized by Gazprom. Thus, Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan and Botas CEO Saltuk Duzyol publicly recommend using “Russian” gas at certain stages in the Nabucco project, for a substantial share of the planned pipeline’s capacity.
Moreover, Turkish officials also seek to enlist Gazprom for building gas storage sites in Turkey, according to Babacan’s media briefing on his talks with counterpart Sergei Lavrov and Industry Minister Viktor Khristenko in Moscow (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 22; Turkish Daily News, February 23). However, a storage deal with Gazprom would clearly have to involve also a pipeline deal with Gazprom, at Nabucco’s expense.
Babacan proposes a sui-generis approach to diversification: “We are open to including Russian [sic] gas in Nabucco. Every country is aiming at diversifying its energy resources. What actually matters for us is having the gas in the Nabucco pipeline come from a variety of sources” (Zaman, February 26). By this logic, Nabucco gas supplies would seem to require diversification away from the initially envisaged non-Russian gas, toward greater reliance on Russian-delivered gas. At a slightly deeper level, however, Turkish officials seem to wish to resuscitate Gazprom’s Blue Stream-Two project via Turkey, in lieu of South Stream, which bypasses Turkey altogether, and amid deepening skepticism about Nabucco’s prospects.
is a frequent speaker at U.S. and European policy conferences and think-tank institutions and a guest lecturer at the NATO Defense College and at Harvard University's National Security-Black Sea Security Program.
1 Μάϊος 2008 1:14 πμ
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